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Conflicts between individual fundamental rights are both pervasive and problematic in 
the system of the European Convention on Human Rights. This paper is an attempt to 
illuminate these two dimensions, as well as a plea for taking conflicts of rights more 
seriously within the Convention legal order. 
 
The paper uses a comparative law perspective to demonstrate that the Convention 
system operates with an exceptionally broad category of ‘conflicts between individual 
fundamental rights’. The size and location of this category are attributable, at least in 
part, to the Convention system’s exclusive reliance on a rights-based perspective and the 
corresponding absence of any ‘division of powers’ jurisdiction for the European Court of 
Human Rights. This institutional set-up, unique among (quasi)-constitutional courts, 
coupled with the absence of a ‘thick’ understanding of democracy at the European level, 
pushes the Court towards framing a large proportion of conflicts between individual and 
collective interests before it as conflicts between individual fundamental rights. 
 
Although current institutional arrangements significantly limit possibilities for the 
Strasbourg Court to modify its approach, the paper does propose a number of ways in 
which the ECHR could take conflicts of fundamental rights more seriously. These 
suggestions focus on situations in which framing a conflict as a clash between individual 
rights may be suboptimal, suscpicious, or both. The situations identified are those in 
which (1) individuals are opposed to the ‘rights’ of majorities, (2) individuals are 
opposed to the ‘rights’ of public officials, and (3) cases in which the distribution of, or 
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‘THE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF OTHERS’: THE ECHR AND ITS 
PECULIAR CATEGORY OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
Jacco Bomhoff∗
1. Introduction: Conflicts of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention 
The theme of ‘conflicting rights’ has an apparent naturalness to it; the rights of 
different individuals are obviously bound to clash, at least on some occasions and 
under some circumstances. This aura of inevitability often comes with the recognition 
that conflicting rights constitute a subject of extraordinary difficulty. We may be able 
to devise moral or political theories to arbitrate between individual rights and the 
public interest, the argument often goes, but conflicting individual fundamental rights 
pose special problems that these broader theories do not cover.1  
These two impressions - inevitability and special difficulty - are confirmed in the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights (‘the Court’). In the Court’s case law we 
find a wide array of cases in which individual rights are pitted against each other.2 
Famous cases have dealt with conflicts between, for example, a right to wear a 
headscarf in public institutions and a right not to be threatened by others’ 
manifestation of religion,3 the right to freedom of expression and the right to freedom 
of religion,4 or the right to freedom of expression and a right to be free from racial 
discrimination.5  
The key doctrinal device for dealing with conflicting individual rights under the 
European Convention on Human Rights (‘the Convention’) is the exception-clause 
‘the rights and freedoms of others’, attached to the rights enshrined in the Articles 8 to 
                                                 
∗  Leiden University (j.a.bomhoff@law.leidenuniv.nl), The Netherlands. Manny thanks to Professors 
Janneke Gerards and Evert Alkema and to Dr. Lorenzo Zucca for their comments. The usual 
disclaimer applies.  
1  Two important contemporary theories of fundamental rights, Dworkin’s rights as trumps-theory 
and Rawls’ understanding of absolute priority for the family of basic liberties as a whole, have 
special difficulties in dealing with conflicts of fundamental rights. For Dworkin, “competing 
rights” are “the least well understood” of all grounds that may be invoked to justify overriding or 
limiting rights. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 193 (London: Duckworth, 1977). Rawls has 
insisted on priority for the basic liberties as a group. J. Rawls, Political liberalism, 356 (New 
York: Columbia University Press,1993) “First, it needs to be emphasised that the basic liberties 
constitute a family, and that it is this family that has priority and not any single liberty by itself 
(…)”. This view puts conflicts between basic liberties in a special category of difficulty. In his 
book Political Liberalism Rawls explicitly acknowledges the force of Hart’s criticism that in A 
Theory of Justice “no satisfactory criterion” had been given “for how the basic liberties are to be 
further specified and adjusted to one another.” (290, my emphasis). 
2  Note: Because of the way the Strasbourg system of rights protection is set up, procedures always 
oppose an individual litigant with a defending State (except in the case of inter-State complaints, 
see Art. 33 of the Convention). ‘Direct’ horizontal litigation between individuals, therefore, is 
impossible before the Strasbourg Court. See Art. 34 of the Convention: “The Court may receive 
applications from any person, non-governmental organization or group of individuals claiming to 
be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the 
Convention or the protocols thereto”. 
3  ECtHR 10 November 2005, Leyla Sahin v. Turkey. 
4  ECtHR 20 September 1994, Otto Preminger v. Austria, Series A, vol. 295-A; ECtHR 25 
November 1996, Wingrove v. The United Kingdom, Reports 1996-V. 
5  ECtHR 23 September 1994, Jersild v. Denmark, Series A, vol. 298. 
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11 of the Convention. This clause allows governments to limit the exercise of 
individual rights such as privacy, freedom of expression and free exercise of religion, 
when the limitations imposed are for the benefit of the protection of ‘the rights and 
freedoms of others’.6 These rights of others are often themselves rights protected 
under the Convention.7 So, for example, in the well-known case of Otto-Preminger-
Institut v. Austria, the Court accepted that the Government’s purpose in prohibiting 
the screening of the film Das Liebeskonzil, was to protect “the rights of citizens not to 
be insulted in their religious feelings by the public expression of views of other 
persons”.8 And in the case of Éditions Plon v. France, a ban on the publication of a 
book on the late President Mitterand, including details of his medical condition, was 
accepted to have been instituted “to protect the late President’s honour, reputation and 
privacy”.9  
It is important to note that not all applications of the clause ‘the rights of others’ 
involve opposing fundamental rights, that is; rights themselves protected under the 
Convention - or even under other fundamental rights instruments. An example of a 
case opposing a Convention right and a non-Convention, non-fundamental right can 
be found in Barthold v. Germany. In that case, a veterinary doctor could be 
disciplined for violating a ban on advertising as the measure was imposed “in order to 
prevent the applicant from acquiring a commercial advantage over professional 
colleagues”; a justification that was found to come within the category of ‘the rights 
and freedoms of others’.10  
At the same time, not all cases involving conflicting fundamental (Convention) rights 
are dealt with exclusively through the exception clause ‘the rights of others’. The 
Court has, for example, consistently held that when it comes to States’ positive 
obligations, the limitation clauses of the Articles 8 to 11 - including the ‘rights and 
freedoms of others’ clause - are not directly applicable but of “a certain relevance” 
                                                 
6  The clause is worded slightly differently in the various relevant provisions: Art. 8 (private life and 
family life: “for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”); Art. 9 (freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion: “for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”); Art. 10 
(freedom of expression: “for the protection of the reputation or rights of others”); Art. 11 (freedom 
of assembly and association: “for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”). 
7  The Court’s seminal statement on the treatment of conflicting Convention rights under ‘the rights 
of others’ can be found in the Chassagnou v. France judgment: ECtHR 29 April 1999, 
Chassagnou v. France, Reports 1999-III, para. 113 (“In the present case the only aim invoked by 
the Government to justify the interference complained of was “protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others”. Where these “rights and freedoms” are themselves among those guaranteed 
by the Convention or its Protocols, it must be accepted that the need to protect them may lead 
States to restrict other rights or freedoms likewise set forth in the Convention. It is precisely this 
constant search for a balance between the fundamental rights of each individual which constitutes 
the foundation of a “democratic society”. The balancing of individual interests that may well be 
contradictory is a difficult matter, and Contracting States must have a broad margin of 
appreciation in this respect, since the national authorities are in principle better placed than the 
European Court to assess whether or not there is a “pressing social need” capable of justifying 
interference with one of the rights guaranteed by the Convention. It is a different matter where 
restrictions are imposed on a right or freedom guaranteed by the Convention in order to protect 
“rights and freedoms” not, as such, enunciated therein. In such a case only indisputable 
imperatives can justify interference with enjoyment of a Convention right”). 
8  Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, supra note 4, para. 48. 
9  ECtHR 18 May 2004, Éditions Plon v. France, Reports 2004-IV, para. 34. 
10  ECtHR 25 March 1985, Barthold v. Germany, Series A., vol. 90, para. 51. See also ECtHR 24 
February 1994, Casado Coca v. Spain, Series A, vol. 285-A, para. 44-46. 
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only.11 In cases where the Convention infringement pleaded by the applicant involves 
the non-fulfilment of a positive obligation, the Court will therefore not apply the 
clause ‘the rights of others’ directly, although it may of course look at the clause for 
guidance. In other cases, the Court seems to prefer talk of duties not to harm others 
attached to the exercise of a Convention right to an extended discussion in terms of 
the limitation clause ‘the rights of others’.12
While the clause ‘the rights of others’ therefore neither exclusively involves 
conflicting fundamental rights nor covers all cases of conflicting Convention rights, it 
would seem that analysis of the use of this clause offers an important and fairly 
representative picture of the way the Convention system deals with conflicting 
fundamental rights. And that picture is of a system in which conflicts of fundamental 
rights are pervasive. It is also, as the next Section will go on to argue, a picture of a 
system that has had great difficulty in finding consistent and convincing ways of 
dealing with cases of conflicting rights. 
These difficulties may be assessed in their own right, through the development of an 
internal critique of the use of the clause ‘the rights of others’ in Strasbourg case law 
(Section 2 of this paper). It could be, however, that the weaknesses identified are mere 
instances and reflections of a more fundamental problem in the way the Convention 
system conceptualizes and ‘solves’ cases of conflicting fundamental rights. This paper 
will use a comparative law perspective to argue that the Court’s difficulties in this 
area stem from the Convention’s reliance on an all encompassing ‘rights-based’ 
approach, to the exclusion of any structural perspective that would combine a focus 
on individual rights with an analysis of governmental powers or of relations between 
majority and minority groups in society.  
In order to make this argument, I will try to show, first, the contingency of any 
category of cases of ‘conflicting fundamental rights’ (Section 3). This contingency 
implies that the basic jurisprudential move of understanding a case as turning upon a 
conflict of rights is - at least to some extent - a matter of institutional choice or design 
on behalf of those framing or applying the guarantees of a rights order.13 This 
contingency is important, because if conflicts of rights are - again at least to some 
extent - not a timeless, universal, unavoidable phenomenon, but, at least partly, a 
matter of choice, then this choice, like any other aspect of the design of rights orders, 
may be analyzed and evaluated in its own right, on the basis of separate normative 
criteria. These criteria, it is important to emphasize, will not necessarily have to be 
identical to those involved in assessing the desirability of substantive outcomes in 
individual cases. Such an assessment and critique of the Convention system’s specific 
institutional design is the subject of the remainder of the paper. 
Section 4 argues that the Convention system’s institutional design is special from a 
comparative perspective in that it is exclusively rights-based. This all encompassing 
focus on rights, it is argued, makes the category of cases potentially involving a 
conflict of such rights much larger than in other systems. By contrast, in systems that 
couple conceptualizations in terms of rights with perspectives based on (limits to) 
                                                 
11  See for example ECtHR 17 October 1986, Rees v. The United Kingdom, Series A, vol. 106, para. 
37; ECtHR 7 July 1989, Gaskin v. The United Kingdom, Series A, vol. 160, para. 42; ECtHR 18 
April 2006, Dickson v. The United Kingdom, para. 32 (case referred to the ECtHR’s Grand 
Chamber). 
12  See for example ECtHR 13 September 2005, I.A. v. Turkey, para. 24 (“a duty to avoid expressions 
that are gratuitously offensive to others and profane”). 
13  I use the term ‘institutional’ as including doctrinal conceptualizations. 
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governmental powers, far fewer cases tend to be seen as involving such conflicts. 
Section 5 offers a number of examples that show how this exclusive focus on rights 
under the Convention has contributed to a number of weaknesses in the Court’s case 
law. Many of these cases, it is argued, are better understood as turning upon a 
normative assessment of a desirable structure for the regulation of clashes between 
individual and collective interests. In these cases, importing elements of a structural 
perspective - involving both individual rights and governmental powers - would be 
beneficial in directing the Court’s attention to what is really at stake.  
Against this background, Section 6 returns to an internal perspective and asks what 
the Court can do to remedy some of the weaknesses in its case law on ‘the rights of 
others’, given the present institutional arrangements and constraints to the Convention 
system. Here, I offer a number of practical guidelines that may be helpful in detecting 
cases in which the use of the clause ‘the rights of others’ may be suboptimal or 
suspicious. Section 7 concludes by putting the critique of the Court’s use of ‘the rights 
of others’ in the context of broader debates on the Court’s role. 
2. ‘The Rights and Freedoms of Others’: Elements of an Internal Critique 
2.1. Introduction 
Several related weaknesses are visible in the Court’s use of ‘the rights of others’-
clause. The Court (a) is not clear about the kinds of rights that could qualify for 
inclusion under ‘the rights of others’, (b) is often vague about which of those rights 
precisely is at issue in specific cases, and (c) does not apply a consistent category to 
who can qualify as rights holders - i.e. who can be ‘others’ for the purposes of the 
clause.14
The first problem has already been alluded to above: the Court’s case law offers no 
coherent category of interests that may receive protection as ‘rights of others’. This is 
perhaps most clearly evinced by the wide range of economic interests the Court has 
included in the category. Government action designed to prohibit an applicant from 
damaging “the business” of a commercial organization by raising “unjustified 
suspicions” concerning its commercial policy qualified under the clause, for example, 
in Markt Intern Verlag v. Germany.15 The Court has also allowed protection of the 
interests of creditors,16 competitors17 and business associations18 under the clause.  
Finally, a range of much more diffuse interests, such as the “social protection of 
tenants” and “the economic well-being of the country” have been held to qualify.19  
                                                 
14  An additional point of critique could be that the Court is not clear on the relationship between the 
clause ‘the rights and freedoms of others’ and other limitation clauses, especially in cases where 
there is a confluence of potentially applicable grounds of limitation.   
15  ECtHR 20 November 1989, Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, Series 
A, vol. 165, para. 31. In his Dissenting Opinion, Judge De Meyer was critical of the Court’s 
approach on this point. See also J.G.C. Schokkenbroek, Toetsing aan de vrijheidsrechten van het 
Europees Verdrag tot bescherming van de rechten van de mens 187 (Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk 
Willink, 1996). 
16  ECtHR 17 July 2003, Luordo v. Italy, Reports 2003-IX, para. 76. 
17  Barthold v. Germany, supra note 10, para. 51. 
18  Casado Coca v. Spain, supra note 10, para. 44-46. 
19  ECtHR 21 November 1995, Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, Series A, vol. 334, para. 25. 
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It is difficult to see what binds this wide range of socio-economic interests together, 
not only to other socio-economic interests found to qualify, but also, and especially, to 
the Convention rights - such as privacy or religion - themselves also included in the 
category of ‘the rights of others’. At the current state of the case-law, it is hard to 
think of any individual interest or ‘right’ that might not be accepted as a legitimate 
ground for the limitation of fundamental rights.20 And yet, the specific use of the term 
rights rather than interests in the limitation clause, and the presumption in favour of 
fundamental rights protection inherent in the whole set-up of the Convention  suggest 
that this limitation clause cannot simply encompass all individual interests great and 
small. Perhaps even more importantly, in a Convention system that emphatically does 
not allow abrogation of the rights contained in the Articles 8 to 11 in function of an 
unspecified general ‘public interest’,21 such a wide and diffuse understanding of this 
specific clause arguably undermines the integrity of the ‘legitimate aim’-test as a 
whole. 
2.2. Confusion about relevant rights in specific cases 
A second criticism concerns those cases in which the Court does not make clear what 
specific ‘right of others’ the government’s action is found to have legitimately 
protected. A prime example is the case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey.22 In this case, the 
‘legitimate aim’ of the interference - a prohibition on the wearing of headscarves in 
public universities - was found to be, amongst other things, the protection of the rights 
of others.23 As this point was not in issue between the parties, the Court did not find it 
necessary to elaborate on what kinds of rights of what sorts of individuals were 
concerned. The decision reveals, however, that what was relevant for the Court was 
the need to prevent other students from feeling threatened in their religious sentiments 
because of the wearing of headscarves by people like the applicant.24 The judgment 
offers no discussion of either the factual urgency or normative value of this aim, 
where such discussion would seem to be altogether required. Who are these other 
students? How many of them were there? In what ways and how seriously were they 
threatened in the free exercise of their religious beliefs by seeing other students wear 
a headscarf? And, more fundamentally, was concern for these specific students really 
the crucial issue in this case?25 However one feels about these questions, it is clear 
                                                 
20  The only case I’ve been able to find in which an aim professed by a respondent government was 
found not to qualify as the legitimate protection of the rights of others is F. v. Switzerland. This 
case, however, concerned Article 12 (right to marry) of the Convention; a provision which does 
not provide a limitative list of limitation clauses. While the Court rejected the argument that a 
temporary prohibition of remarriage was “designed to preserve the rights of others, namely of 
those of the future spouse of the divorced person”, the Court was nevertheless still able to accept 
“the stability of marriage” as “a legitimate aim which is in the public interest”. ECtHR 18 
December 1987, F. v. Switzerland, Series A, vol. 128, para. 36. The case is discussed infra, in 
Section 5.2. 
21  The limitation clauses to the Articles 8 to 11 do not contain a possibility of limiting fundamental 
rights ‘in the public interest’. The situation is different for Convention provisions that do not 
follow the ‘paragraph 2’ construction, such as Article 12 (right to marry) and Article 3 of the 1st 
Protocol (right to free elections). See the discussion of the cases F. v. Switzerland (Art. 12) and 
Hirst v. The United Kingdom (Art. 3, P1) infra note 85 in Section 5.2. 
22  ECtHR Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, supra note 3. 
23  Id., para. 99. 
24  Id., see especially para. 111 and para. 115. 
25  It will be argued below that a structural perspective on the case indicates that the main concern 
was not and should not have been the rights of groups of individuals but the very structure of 
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that they would have merited a more extensive treatment by the Court than an 
unqualified assertion that ‘the rights of others’ - as agreed between the parties - was 
the legitimate aim pursued.  
2.3. Who may be ‘others’? 
The Court, thirdly, does not seem to adhere to a clear definition of who can qualify as 
rights holders in the abstract and precise identifications of who the relevant holders 
are in individual cases. The case law offers a broad panorama, ranging from cases in 
which individuals whose rights are said to conflict with those of the applicant are 
specifically named - a child called Kimberly in the Venema case,26 President 
Mitterand and his relatives in Éditions Plon - through various forms of closed or open 
groups of individuals - “the Christian community” in Giniewski,27 the applicant’s 
neighbours in Connors28 and his creditors in Luordo29 - to society at large - “the 
public” in Casado Coca,30 “road users” in Buck31 and anyone affected by street crime 
in Peck32. The definition of the class of ‘others’ is rarely a point of contention before 
the Court. Whenever parties actually do disagree on the extent of the relevant class, as 
was the case, for example, in Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, where it 
was argued that “the unborn” could qualify as ‘others’ under Article 10 para. 2, the 
Court is generally quick to opt for an alternative ground for limitation.33
One important problem these differences in class size and makeup contribute to is the 
correct aggregation of interests in individual cases.34 Take the Luordo case - just 
mentioned - as an example. When identifying the ‘others’ for the purposes of the 
protection of ‘the rights of others’ as a limitation on Article 10, the Court refers only 
to the applicant’s creditors, but it seems likely that the interests of all creditors of 
individuals in similar circumstances as the applicant would be affected by the Court’s 
                                                                                                                              
Turkish (secular) society. If Leyla Sahin would have been privately instructed in one-on-one 
seminars conducted by university teachers on university grounds, with no other students present, 
this structural question would not have gone away and government objections should arguably 
still have carried the same force as in the original setting. 
26  ECtHR 17 December 2002, Venema v. The Netherlands, Reports 2002-X, para. 73. 
27  ECtHR 31 January 2006, Giniewski v. France, para. 40. 
28  ECtHR 27 May 2004, Connors v. The United Kingdom, para. 69. 
29  Luordo v. Italy, supra note 16, para. 76. 
30  Casado Coca v. Spain, supra note 10, para. 46. 
31  ECtHR 28 April. 2005, Buck v. Germany, para. 41. 
32  ECtHR 28 January 2003, Peck v. The United Kingdom, Reports 2003-I, para. 67. 
33  ECtHR 29 October 1992, Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, Series A, vol. 246-A, 
para. 63. The Court opted for the clause “the protection of morals”. 
34  The locus classicus of discussions on the importance of a proper aggregation of interests in 
judicial balancing, is C. Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme 
Court’s Balancing test, (755) Harvard Law Review 763 (1963). (“One thing is perfectly clear, that 
under no circumstances should the Court formulate the conflict in a particular case, or identify 
the elements of the balance to be struck, in such a way that the statement itself prejudices the 
decision. It would, indeed, be begging the question to purport to balance some highly generalized 
and obviously crucial interest, such as the right of the legislature to inform itself of matters 
bearing on national security, against some rather particular and narrowly conceived claim such 
as the right of a particular individual to withhold a particular, perhaps trivial, item of information 
from a committee on this occasion. Any such formulation, of course, seems to require only one 
answer, but it does so at the expense of ignoring the fact that the claim of the witness may be 
stated in equally generalized form, and therefore may perhaps take on equally impressive 
proportions”). See also M. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory 83 
Michigan Law Review 1502, (1985), 1514 for additional discussion.
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decision. The Court’s reasoning offers no clues as to whether these other interests 
were taken into account, making an evaluation of its justification based on a weighing 
of interests very difficult.  
A second striking aspect of the Court’s case law on rights holders is the inclusion of 
public authorities in this category. In the famous case of Rees v. The United Kingdom, 
for example, the Court, in the context of an analysis of positive obligations under 
Article 8, referred to “the position of third parties, including public authorities” when 
assessing countervailing “interests of others”.35 Public authorities also figured in the 
‘rights of others’ context in cases such as Connors v. The United Kingdom (a local 
government body)36 and Nikula v. Finland (a public prosecutor)37. These cases are 
problematic, if only for the simple reason that important questions with regard to, for 
example, the extent to which these public authorities can be considered holders of 
individual rights, receive no explicit consideration from the Court. 
2.4. Internal critique and structural weaknesses 
This Section has offered a number of criticisms of the Court’s treatment of the 
limitation clause ‘the rights of others’. These criticisms were formulated from an 
internal point of view, by reference to benchmarks of principled doctrine, coherence 
and consistency. The remainder of this paper will argue that many of the weaknesses 
in the Court’s case law stem from a more fundamental problem in the way the 
Convention system conceptualizes cases in terms of rights alone, rather than in terms 
of rights and powers. As a prelude to this argument, the next Section will consider the 
contingency of any category of ‘conflicts of fundamental rights’. 
3. The Contingency of the Category of ‘Conflicts of Fundamental Rights’ 
3.1. Introduction 
Discussion of the topic of ‘conflicts of individual fundamental rights’ would seem to 
imply that these conflicts are in some way, as a category, distinguishable from other 
types of legal-institutionalized social conflicts. Conflicts between individual 
fundamental rights should, on this assumption, be recognizably different from, for 
example, conflicts between a fundamental right and some public or collective interest 
or between a fundamental right and an individual interest not protected by a 
fundamental legal right.38 And even where a conflict would, on its face, seem to 
                                                 
35  Rees v. The United Kingdom, supra note 11, para. 43-44. Note that this case was not decided 
under the ‘the rights of others’ limitation clause. In his comment on the case, professor Alkema 
has noted that not only the interests of other private parties were at stake, but “also, and especially, 
those of the state itself”. See E.A. Alkema, The European Convention as a Constitution and its 
Court as a Constitutional Court 41 and onwards, in: P. Mahoney, F. Matscher, H. Petzold and L. 
Wildhaber (eds.), Protecting Human Rights: The European Perspective. Studies in Memory of 
Rolv Ryssdal (Köln: Carl Heymans Verlag KG, 2000) . 
36  Connors v. The United Kingdom, supra note 28, para. 69. 
37  ECtHR 21 March 2002, Nikula v. Finland, Reports 2002-II, para. 38. Public authorities were 
arguably also among the rights holders identified by the Court in ECtHR 11 December 2003, 
Yankov v. Bulgaria, Reports 2003-XII (extracts), para. 126-128.  
38  For a detailed discussion with regard to the Convention system, see A. McHarg, Reconciling 
Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 62 Modern Law Review 671 (1999). For 
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implicate two opposing fundamental rights, it should still be possible, on the same 
assumption, to differentiate between ‘real’, ‘actual’ or ‘direct’ conflicts between such 
rights, on the one hand, and conflicts that are ‘hypothetical’, ‘remote’ or that only 
‘indirectly’ involve these rights, on the other.39
This Section aims to show that any category of ‘conflicts of individual fundamental 
rights’ will be highly contingent upon factual circumstances, the scope and focus of 
rights guaranteed, substantive standards of protection adhered to, and the acceptance 
of rival conceptualizations, for example in terms of duties or governmental powers. 
The purpose of this part is not to deny the existence of ‘conflicts of individual 
fundamental rights’ altogether, but rather to show that (a) the location and scope of 
such a category will differ from one rights order to the other, and (b) that any 
definition of a category of ‘conflicts of individual fundamental rights’ will have to 
include a far more precise and longer list of elements than merely those of opposing 
fundamental rights claims by two or more individuals. The discussion of contingency 
in this part forms a prelude to the development, in the remainder of the text, of the 
thesis that the ECHR system operates with a comparatively large category of conflicts 
of individual fundamental rights.  
3.2. Factual contingency and the ‘true conflict’/non-conflict boundary 
Conflicts of individual fundamental rights are, self-evidently, contingent upon factual 
circumstances. A true conflict of individual rights may be present only when it is 
factually impossible to satisfy the requirements of both rights. When it comes to law, 
rights and entitlements, however, the realm of the factually possible is bound up with 
political, institutional, cultural background considerations to such an extent as to 
make analytical separation almost impossible. The problem of conjoined twins, often 
used as an example in discussions on conflicts of rights, may serve as an illustration.40 
Where conjoined twins share one or more vital organs, saving both individuals may 
be absolutely impossible - given the current, obviously historically contingent state of 
medical knowledge - or may be prohibitively expensive. At some point on a scale of 
operation costs, what used to be a conflict between the individual rights of the two 
twins on the one hand and societal interests on the other, becomes a conflict between 
the individual rights of the different siblings that cannot both be satisfied.41 The 
                                                                                                                              
the United States see, for example, D. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government 
Interests: Madisonian Principles versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 Virginia Law Review 1521 
(1992). 
39  Cf. O. DeSchutter in this volume. 
40  A discussion of this problem - based on a case from the United Kingdom - can be found in J. 
Alder, The Sublime and the Beautiful: Incommensurability and Human Rights, 2006 Public Law, 
697-721,711. 
41  It is, in my view, entirely legitimate to argue that the fact that we are today unable to save two 
individuals born conjointly with only one heart to share, stems not only from immutable facts of 
nature - the fact that humans cannot live without a constant flow of oxygenated blood - but also 
from a long range of implicit and probably often unconscious decisions to direct public resources 
to other areas of need - a strong public preference to spend on research into cancer, for example. 
This does, of course, not diminish the tragic nature of the conflict between the rights of the two 
individuals concerned as it presents itself here and now. Thinking about this kind of ‘translation’ 
of conflicts between rights and collective interests into conflicts of individual rights is complicated 
significantly, however, by differences in perspectives on the relevant ‘transactional frames’. In a 
paradigm of individual rights versus collective interests it is at least theoretically possible to 
broaden the relevant ‘transactional frame’ in such a way as to include not merely the harmful state 
action complained of, but also a range of facilitating or beneficial state actions that occur before or 
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location of this point of transformation will vary from time to time and place to place, 
significantly complicating the task of defining what is and what is not a conflict of 
individual fundamental rights.42  
A second complicating factor is the fact that the assessment of what is factually 
possible is generally made locally, within a single legal and economic order. Thinking 
about conflicts of fundamental rights becomes much harder, however, when a multi-
jurisdictional perspective is adopted. What if, again in the context of conjoined twins, 
saving both individuals is not possible within their own specific jurisdiction, but is 
factually possible in at least one hospital in at least one jurisdiction on earth? The 
conflict may, in that case, well be fundamental to the local rights order then, but this 
is clearly not universally so.  
The aim of this paragraph, once again, is not to deny the existence of inescapable 
dilemmas or conflicts between fundamental rights in general, or their presence in 
concrete cases. The defamation by one individual of another (private) individual, for 
example, cannot be translated into a conflict between individual rights and collective 
interests in the way that the rights of conjoined twins can. The argument so far merely 
serves to emphasize three points. First: any definition of ‘conflicts of fundamental 
rights’ will have to include a precise description of factual circumstances and their 
influence on the (im)possibility of satisfying both rights involved. Second: when 
determining the realm of the factually possible courts must be conscious of the extent 
to which the ‘merely factual’ is bound up with a wide variety of normatively coloured 
background considerations. And finally: given these two earlier observations, the 
category of ‘true’ conflicts of individual fundamental rights within any rights order is 
likely to be, in fact, smaller than perhaps commonly thought.  
3.3. Institutional contingency and the comparative perspective: Introduction 
Differences between legal orders assume an even more direct, critical importance 
once we begin to consider the scope, form and content of their systems of rights 
protection. As different legal orders grant different rights, have divergent 
understandings of what these rights are supposed to protect, adopt different 
substantive standards for the protection of these rights or use alternative 
conceptualizations to frame similar conflicts of interests and values, the proportion of 
conflicts between interests and/or values expressed in terms of ‘conflicts of 
fundamental rights’ will vary as between them.43 This paragraph aims at giving an 
overview of some of these dimensions of possible divergence, using comparative 
references from a number of Western legal orders. 
                                                                                                                              
after the alleged rights infringement. This ‘broadening’ of the relevant frame is not possible within 
the individual right versus individual right model. See on the topic of ‘framing’ generally, D.J. 
Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 Yale Law Journal 1313-1317, 1311 
(2002). 
42  The scope for conflicts between absolutely irreconcilable wants and interests is likely to differ 
significantly between legal orders in different states of economic development or with vastly 
different levels of economic redistribution. While these levels may be broadly comparable for 
Western legal orders, wider comparative studies of conflicts of rights, including African or South-
Asian rights orders, for example, should clearly take this variable into account.  
43  More precisely; not only the proportion of these cases, but also their location as a group within the 




3.4. Institutional contingency (1): Understandings of rights 
The contingency of conflicts between rights upon the scope of rights protection in 
particular rights orders is self-evident. No rights, no conflicts between rights. Of 
course conflicts between underlying values and interests will not go away upon 
merely withholding recognition of the status of ‘fundamental right’; it is merely the 
case that if these interests have not received fundamental rights protection in a 
particular rights order, any conflict between these interests and other interests will, 
necessarily, not take the form of a conflict between fundamental rights.  
This form of contingency is visible most clearly where one legal order grants certain 
rights that are not known in other legal orders. Environmental protection, for example, 
has, at least partially, been given fundamental rights status in Europe through the 
European Court’s interpretation of Article 8 of the Convention.44 As such a status is 
unknown in the United States, conflicts involving individual and collective interests in 
a healthy living environment can never find expression as conflicts of fundamental 
rights there.  
Even when the same fundamental right is known in different rights orders, variations 
in substantive doctrines used for the interpretation and application of this right may 
show a similar effect. In United States constitutional law on freedom of expression, 
for example, an ‘incitement to violence or imminent lawless action’ standard provides 
a baseline for the permissibility of governmental action.45 Application of this standard 
meant that in the famous case of Brandenburg v. Ohio, a clear clash between the 
interests of Neo-Nazi’s wanting to conduct a march and the interests of Holocaust 
survivors not wanting to be confronted with manifestations of Nazism, was not 
understood to involve a conflict of fundamental rights. The Court’s test in this case 
turned only on an assessment of the likelihood of violence; the degree to which the 
manifestation would be hurtful to bystanders was only relevant insofar as potentially 
contributing to such violence, not as a measure of a violation of any of these 
bystanders’ fundamental rights.46
The ‘same’ fundamental right may, finally, have a different focus or a different 
principal object of protection in different legal orders, in ways that will similarly 
affect the location and scope of the category of ‘conflicts of fundamental rights’ cases. 
By way of a very crude distinction, many fundamental rights may be understood as 
either being principally protection devices against governmental action, or as being 
predominantly attributes of individuals in their quality of human beings.47 The 
                                                 
44  Cf. ECtHR 9 December 1994, Lopez Ostra v. Spain, Series A, vol. 303-C; ECtHR 7 August 2003, 
Hatton v. The United Kingdom, Reports 2003-VIII. See for a more extensive overview of the 
relevant case-law the contribution of Janneke Gerards to this volume. 
45  United States Supreme Court, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
46  For criticism of the Supreme Court’s neglect to ‘look at the Constitution as a whole’, however, see 
J.E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Democracy, 72 Fordham Law Review 1435, 1467 (2004). 
47  See on the distinction J. Raz, Liberty and Rights, in: J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom 257 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986): “[g]iven the widespread assumption that the special 
status of constitutional rights must be explained by their special moral force, it is worthwhile 
pointing out that there are well-known alternative arguments in favour of entrenched 
constitutional rights, namely arguments based on institutional considerations”, my emphasis. See 
also R.H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 
45 Hastings Law Journal 711, 724 (1994). Pildes distinguishes between rights as “recognitions of 
the essential elements of the person in the way that contemporary liberalism conceives individual 
dignity, autonomy or freedom” (the ‘individualistic paradigm’) and rights as “mechanisms 
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practice around most rights in most legal orders is built on elements of both 
conceptions, but differences in emphasis may have important implications for the 
category of ‘conflicts of fundamental rights’. An instrumentalist conception of 
fundamental rights - rights as primarily protective against governmental action - is 
likely to occasion a more narrow category of ‘conflicts of fundamental rights cases’ 
than an individualistic conception that sees potential threats to fundamental rights 
coming from both governments and other individuals.  
 In a number of articles, Professor James Whitman, has argued that conceptions of the 
fundamental right to ‘privacy’ differ fundamentally as between Germany - or Europe 
more broadly - and the United States, in a way closely related to the basic difference 
just discussed.48 According to Whitman’s influential view, a ‘dignity’ or ‘honour’ 
focused perspective is prevalent in German - European - legal culture, while the 
American view has tended to concentrate on the ‘liberty’ dimension of privacy.49 
Comparing the histories of litigation on this right in Germany and the US bears out 
this distinction and its effect on the category of ‘conflicts of fundamental rights’; the 
proportion of privacy cases pitting one individual’s privacy rights against another 
individual’s fundamental right - generally of freedom of expression - is far greater in 
Germany than in the US, where cases tend to concern governmental invasions of 
privacy. Many of the most famous freedom of expression and right to privacy cases in 
Germany, therefore, present conflicts of fundamental rights in ways that simply do not 
arise in the United States.50  
3.5. Institutional contingency (2): Alternative conceptualizations 
A conflict with another fundamental right is only one out of several possible ways in 
which a limitation on a fundamental right may be understood. To the extent that a 
legal order frames these limitations in alternative ways, the same clashes between 
fundamental rights and countervailing private and societal interests will, again, not be 
seen as involving a conflict between fundamental rights. Two important examples of 
such alternatives are ‘duties’ and ‘powers’.  
Reference was made in the Introduction to the way the Strasbourg Court sometimes 
limits individual rights by appending duties not to harm others to the rights contained 
in the Convention. In the I.A. v. Turkey case, for example, the Court spoke of a “duty 
                                                                                                                              
through which the differentiation of political authority is maintained” (the ‘structural paradigm’). 
On the structural paradigm, see further infra section 5. 
48  J.Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty, 113 Yale Law 
Journal 1151 (2004). See also J.Q. Whitman, ‘Human Dignity’ in Europe and the United States: 
the Social Foundations, in: G. Nolte (ed.), European and US Constitutionalism 108 and onwards 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
49  See for example J.Q. Whitman (2004), supra note 48, 1161 (“Continental privacy protections are, 
at their core, a form of protection of a right to respect and personal dignity. (…) The prime enemy 
of our privacy, according to this continental conception, is the media (…). By contrast, America, 
in this as in so many things, is much more oriented towards values of liberty, and especially 
liberty against the state.”). 
50  See, for example, the famous Mephisto case of 1971 (30 BVerfGE 173). More recently claims 
brought by Princess Caroline of Monaco against a number of German newspapers have led to 
decisions from both the German Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights. 
See ECtHR 24 June 2004, Von Hannover v. Germany, Reports 2004-VI. 
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to avoid expressions that are gratuitously offensive to others and profane”.51 Use of 
the category of duties will self-evidently limit the proportion of conflicts of interests 
and values conceptualized as involving conflicts between fundamental rights. 
Professor George Fletcher has used the example of ‘flag-burning’ to emphasize the 
different ways in which the same basic social conflict might be conceptualized in 
different legal systems and to show the role ‘duties’ may play in this respect. Flag-
burning, as an instance of symbolic speech, opposes societal and individual interests 
in freedom of expression on the one hand, and societal and individual interests in 
public order and the protection of social cohesion on the other. According to Fletcher 
a German lawyer might well formulate the relevant conflict in the ‘language of 
duties’.52 At the same time, Fletcher argues, “it is doubtful that an American lawyer 
could be brought to conceptualize the problem of flag burning as a matter of civic 
duty rather than of conflicting rights and interests. The grooves in the American legal 
mind lead one toward identifying the rights of the individual and the opposing 
interests of the state or community. There is no slot for duty (…)”.53 Flag-burning 
specifically is not especially likely to be seen by any legal order to involve conflicting 
individual rights, but Fletcher’s observation may easily be extended to such cases. 
Moreover, the European Court, in its case-law on expression deemed hurtful by many 
in the relevant population, has spoken of a conflict between Article 10 rights of 
applicants and “the rights of citizens not to be insulted in their religious feelings by 
the public expression of views of other persons”.54 Cases involving very similar 
factual constellations to flag-burning have, therefore, actually been treated as 
‘conflicts of fundamental rights’ by the Strasbourg Court.  
A final alternative conceptualization of conflicts between the interests of - or values 
held by - individuals that needs to be discussed here, proceeds on the basis of the 
concept of powers. The strong emphasis on fundamental rights as constraining 
devices on majority (governmental) powers in many liberal constitutional theories 
suggests that rights and governmental powers are importantly interconnected. In many 
views of the role of fundamental rights, these rights serve to limit, and may 
themselves - at least in some cases - be limited by, governmental powers.55 Professor 
Richard Fallon has been an especially forceful promoter of the view that it is not 
possible to think about constitutional rights without an idea of “what powers it would 
be prudent or desirable for government to have”.56 This conceptual connection, Fallon 
suggests, is reflected in United States Supreme Court practice. “Seldom if ever”, he 
writes, “does the Supreme Court say that one constitutional right - such as speech - 
must leave off because another constitutional right - such as privacy - begins. Rather, 
the Court says that the constitutional speech right leaves off because the government’s 
                                                 
51  I.A. v. Turkey, supra note 12, para. 24 (with reference to Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, supra 
note 4, para. 49 and  ECtHR 10 July 2003, Murphy v. Ireland, Reports 2003-IX (extracts), para. 
67). 
52  G.P. Fletcher, Constitutional Identity, 14 Cardozo Law Review 737, 741 (1993). 
53  Id., 742. 
54  See for example Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, supra note 4, para. 48. 
55  See for example R.H. Fallon, Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 Georgia Law 
Review 343 (1993). Frederick Schauer, while criticizing elements of Fallon’s view of the 
interconnectedness of rights, interests and powers, still conceptualizes rights as “shields against 
governmental interests”, thereby allowing the relevant (for our purposes) connection between 
rights and governmental powers to stand. See F. Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 
27 Georgia Law Review 415, 429 (1993). 
56  R.H. Fallon, supra note 55, 344. 
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power to define and protect a non-constitutional right - such as privacy - should begin. 
The conceptual limit of the constitutional right is not, in other words, another right, 
but a power of government, supported and identified by reference to underlying 
interests”.57 To the extent that the US constitutional order indeed conceptualizes 
conflicts as involving rights and powers rather than opposing fundamental rights, its 
category of ‘conflicts of fundamental rights’ is, again, bound to be smaller.  
4. Convention exceptionalism and the missing structural perspective 
4.1. Introduction 
The discussion in the preceding paragraphs gives rise to three basic questions: (1) 
how do different legal orders ‘rank’ when it comes to the relative size of their 
category of ‘conflicts of fundamental rights cases’, (2) why do these differences arise, 
and (3) how can we evaluate the institutional choices made by different rights orders 
with regard to their category of ‘conflicts of fundamental rights’? The remainder of 
this paper will argue that the Convention system works with an exceptionally wide 
category by comparative standards (ad 1) and that this approach has a number of 
serious drawbacks (ad 3). Before discussing these drawbacks in the next two Sections, 
the next paragraph briefly elaborates upon the existence of, and reasons for, this form 
of Convention exceptionalism (ad 1 and 2). 
It is impossible within the scope of this paper to offer anything like an exhaustive 
assessment of the relative scope of the category of ‘conflicts of fundamental rights 
cases’ in a number of different rights orders. The material presented so far, however, 
contains a number of indices that the Convention systems’ category might indeed be 
rather broad, in comparison to US theory and practice, for example.58 Two of these 
factors stand out, it seems, in terms of their explanatory force for the question of why 
the Convention system operates with an extremely wide category of ‘conflicts of 
fundamental rights’. The first is the complete absence of any ‘powers’-based 
alternative conceptualization of conflicts under the Convention system. The second is 
the lack of a thick, richly substantive notion of a ‘democratic society’. The next 
paragraphs discuss these two factors in turn. 
                                                 
57  R.H. Fallon, supra note 55, 362 (my emphasis). 
58  Factors that I would like to posit without being able to argue them here are: (1) the comparative 
extent of rights proliferation in Europe and the US, and (2) the effects of the ‘human rights’ 
dimension of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Convention.  Ad (1) It would seem that 
rights proliferation has generally been stronger in Europe than in the United States. The 
Convention, as do most Continental constitutions, simply contains significantly more rights than 
the US Bill of Rights, and the European Court’s practice has given many of these rights a far 
broader interpretation than the US Supreme Court has been willing to do for its system. More 
rights interpreted more broadly means more potential scope for conflicts between rights (cf. E. 
Brems, Conflicting Human Rights: An Exploration in the Context of the Right to a Fair Trail in 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 27 
Human Rights Quarterly 294 (2005) for a similar argument). Ad (2) The specific background of 
Convention rights may provide another reason. These rights’ origins in the human rights tradition 
suggest that they will be dependent on dignity-focused, non-consequentialist, non-instrumentalist 
accounts of rights, to a greater extent than fundamental rights in other constitutional systems such 
as, for example, the US. In such accounts, threats to the exercise of rights are more easily thought 
to come from other individuals as well as from governments, increasing the scope for potential 
‘conflicts of fundamental rights’. 
14 
 
4.2. Convention exceptionalism (1): No division of powers jurisdiction 
The Convention system was set up as, and still retains crucial features of, an 
international enforcement system for the protection of human rights.59 Over time, 
however, actors from within this system have increasingly sought to emphasize the 
development of the Convention into a constitution for Europe, and of the Strasbourg 
Court into a European constitutional court. In the famous Loizidou case, the Court 
affirmed that the Convention constituted a “constitutional instrument of European 
public order”.60 Former President Wildhaber of the Court has similarly invoked the 
‘constitutional’ dimension of the Convention mechanism, alluding to the role of the 
Strasbourg Court as a  “European quasi-constitutional” court and to the human rights 
enshrined in the Convention as “anchored (…) in the concepts of constitutionalism”.61  
Among constitutional orders and constitutional courts, however, the Convention 
system stands out markedly. Modern constitutional courts generally have two 
functions; they supervise the division of powers that their constitution instituted and 
they have some form of jurisdiction over fundamental rights.62 Both the French 
Constitutional Council and the German Federal Constitutional Court are examples of 
this type. Very often, as for example with the Belgian Constitutional Tribunal and the 
French Constitutional Council, these courts are originally set-up primarily for reasons 
of power division - upon federalization (Belgium) or upon a move towards dualism 
between executive and legislative powers (France) - and only develop a rights 
jurisdiction afterwards.63 As Martin Shapiro has argued, the policing function of 
                                                 
59  For a general discussion of the Convention’s origins, see C. Ovey and R.C.A. White, The 
European Convention on Human Rights (4th ed.), 1-6 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 
with references. 
60  ECtHR 23 March 1995, Loizidou v. Turkey, Series A, vol. 310, para. 75. 
61  Speech by Mr. L. Wilbhaber on the occasion of the opening of the Judicial Year, 20 January 2006. 
(http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/227A68E9-89EA-46DF-A10C-
1E81422C3E6E/0/2006OpeningofthejudicialyearWildhaberTugcuEnglish.pdf, last accessed 22 
March 2007). See also President Wildhaber’s speech at the inauguration of the new building for 
the Constitutional Court of South Africa, 20 March 2004: ‘Judging in a modern constitutional 
democracy. Employing the comparative law method in constitutional decision-making’ 
  (http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/2738F4D8-C03C-4E94-BF6E-
CD8E83D9C6DC/0/2004_Johannesburg_Constitutional_Court.pdf, last accessed 22 March 2007). 
Before President Wildhaber, President Rolv Ryssdal had also, on more than one occasion, referred 
to the European Court of Human Rights as a (future) constitutional court for Europe. See E.A. 
Alkema, supra note 35, 41 for references. 
62  See for an overview M. Shapiro and A. Stone Sweet, Constitutional Judicial Review, in: M. 
Shapiro and A. Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics and Judicialization 136 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
63  Commenting on developments in France since the pivotal Association Law Case (1971), James 
Beardsley wrote of the Constitutional Council: “the Council’s powers of constitutional review 
have been regarded as a device for the maintenance of the limits imposed on Parliament’s 
legislative competence by the 1958 Constitution and not as a mechanism for the protection of the 
liberties of the citizen, against legislative limitation”. J. Beardsley, The Constitutional Council and 
Constitutional Liberties in France, 20 American Journal of Comparative Law 431 (1972). In the 
Association Law Case, the Constitutional Council invalidated legislation on the grounds of 
infringement of fundamental rights for the first time. See Constitutional Council, Decision of July 
16th 1971, CC 71-44. For Belgium, the website of the Cour d’Arbitrage itself offers a very concise 
overview of the relevant developments: “The Court of Arbitration owes its existence to the 
development of the Belgian unitary state into a federal state. (…) In the constitutional amendment 
of 15 July 1988, the competence of the Court was extended to include the supervision of the 
observance of Articles 10, 11 and 24 of the Constitution guaranteeing the principles of equality, 
non-discrimination and the rights and liberties in respect of education. (…)”. Later legislation -
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division of powers jurisdiction tends to provide these courts with at least one strong 
basis of legitimacy; legitimacy capital that they may choose to, or need to, expend on 
controversial rights cases.64
This background of division of powers jurisdiction to any activity in protecting 
fundamental rights is important not only for legitimacy reasons. The business of 
demarcating powers provides constitutional courts with a conceptual apparatus and 
vocabulary that can be extended to the rights cases. For the United States Supreme 
Court, all its constitutional cases are, in an important way, directly about limitations 
to powers. One case may be about limits to the federal government’s power to impose 
rules on states, another may be about limits to the president’s power vis-à-vis 
Congress and a third about the limits of any of these authorities’ powers with regard 
to individual liberties. It is against this background that the ‘alternative 
conceptualization’ in terms of rights and powers, discussed above, must be 
understood.   
The European Court of Human Rights does not fit this model. Alone among 
constitutional courts - if that is what it is -, its jurisdiction is exclusively rights based. 
All the Court has to work with are the enumerated rights in the Convention and its 
Protocols.65 The Court simply has no jurisdiction to directly engage in the assessment 
of normatively desirable structures of government; all it can say on issues of structure 
and power is by way of indirect means, through its exegesis of Convention rights. 
This absence of ‘division of powers’ jurisdiction makes it that much harder for the 
Court to conceive of conflicts as involving opposing rights and powers. Adopting a 
‘rights versus rights’ perspective in situations where other legal orders - containing 
both ‘pillars’ of constitutional law - might not do so, correspondingly becomes all the 
more natural.  
4.3. Convention exceptionalism (2): Visions of a ‘democratic society’ 
This missing ‘leg’ of ordinary constitutional court jurisdiction66 goes hand in hand 
with a more substantive observation: the Convention system works with 
comparatively thin notions of democratic order and democratic society.67 Where 
ordinary constitutional courts or supreme courts with constitutional jurisdiction may 
base their assessments of the relationship between individual rights and governmental 
                                                                                                                              
based on the same constitutional amendment of 1988 - has extended the rights-jurisdiction of the 
Court even further. See: http://www.arbitrage.be/en/common/home.html, last accessed 28 March 
2007).  
64  M. Shapiro, The Success of Democracy and Judicial Review, in: M. Shapiro and A. Stone Sweet, 
supra note 62, 182. 
65  Cf. E.A. Alkema, supra note 35, 42 (“The Convention is specific about a few and silent about 
most powers of government”), and 46 (“At this juncture we can conclude that the ECtHR, rather 
than a constitutional court, is a court sui generis. The ‘dramatis personae’, its cast, is incomplete 
and so are the ‘parts’ in the absence of a comprehensive constitutional text”).  
66  Note: this understanding of the Convention system as ‘one legged’, is not identical to the reference 
made in E.A. Alkema, supra note 35, 45 (in terms of actors able to elicit a Court ruling). 
67  S. Marks, The European Convention on Human Rights and its ‘Democratic Society’, 66 British 
Yearbook of International Law 234, 237 (1996), also uses the term ‘thin’ conception to describe 
the Convention understanding of ‘democratic society’. On the notion of a ‘democratic society’ in 
the Court’s case-law, see also G. Van der Schijff, Het Concept van Democratie in het EVRM, 
547-574 and P. Vanden Heede, Het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens en het 
partijverbod: dansen op een slap koord, 193-232, both in: M. Adams and P. Popelier, Recht en 
Democratie: de Democratische Verbeelding in het Recht (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2004). 
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powers on thick, substantive, historically and culturally contingent conceptions of 
democracy,68 the Strasbourg Court has to contend itself with an amalgamated, 
narrow, compromise-based understanding. Despite frequent allusions to the ideal of a 
‘democratic society’, a concept explicitly mentioned in the Convention itself, the 
Court has been unable, it is submitted, to fashion a clear picture of what this 
‘democratic society’ may be thought to encompass, other than that it should be 
“tolerant”, open, and “broadminded”,69 should allow for the resolution of problems 
through “dialogue” rather than through violence,70 and be a “neutral and impartial 
organizer of the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs” so that “public order, 
religious harmony and tolerance” may be achieved.71 What more can the Court say 
about the State’s role in the free exercise of religion than that Member States have a 
general “duty of neutrality and impartiality”,72 when among these members are 
counted states with such highly divergent understandings of state-church relations as 
France, Sweden, Italy and Turkey? 
Faced with the tremendous difficulty of building a coherent, substantive, Europe-wide 
ideal of democracy out of the multitude of divergent traditions among Member States, 
it is understandable that the Court has centred its conceptual apparatus around what 
may count as the safe, central element of its mandate; the definition of individual 
rights. If accurate, this assessment has important implications for our topic of 
‘conflicts of fundamental rights’. For if the elaboration of the ‘public’-side to conflicts 
between individual and public interests runs into difficulty, the conceptual move of 
understanding this ‘public’-side as an aggregation of individual rights becomes highly 
attractive. 
5. The Missing Structural Perspective in Convention Case-law 
5.1. Introduction 
The heavy reliance on ‘rights’ in the peculiar institutional setting of the Convention 
system may not dictate outcomes in individual cases. But divergences in conceptual 
approaches do direct judges’ attention to particular aspects of cases and away from 
others. I have argued that the Convention mechanism’s institutional set-up has 
directed the Court’s gaze away from questions of power and structure, and placed it 
                                                 
68  For Germany, see, for example, the discussion in Chapter 5 of D. Kommers, The Constitutional 
Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 166(Durham and London: Duke University 
Press,1997), with references to further sources in German. The literature on democracy 
conceptions in US constitutional law is immense. Classic references are  J. H. Ely, Democracy 
And Distrust (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1980) And B. Ackerman We the People: 
Volume 1, Foundations (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1991). 
69  ECtHR 12 December 1976, Handyside v. The United Kingdom, Series A, vol. 24, para. 49. 
70  ECtHR 30 January 1998, United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, Reports 1998-I, para. 57 
(“The Court considers one of the principal characteristics of democracy to be the possibility it 
offers of resolving a country’s problems through dialogue, without recourse to violence, even 
when they are irksome”). 
71  ECtHR 13 February 2003, Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey, Reports 2003-II, para. 91 
(“in democratic societies, in which several religions coexist within one and the same population, 
it may be necessary to place restrictions on this freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the 
various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected”). See also ECtHR 27 June 2000, 
Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, Reports 2000-VII, para. 84.  
72  Refah Partisi v. Turkey, supra note 71, para. 91; Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France,supra note 
71, para. 84. 
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firmly on issues of rights. This Section offers three examples of the practical effects 
of this approach. 
5.2. The missing structural perspective (1): Difficult aims 
The exclusively rights-based set-up of the Convention mechanism shows strains 
whenever the Court is confronted with rights limitations imposed in the name of 
objectives not specifically enumerated in the limitation-clauses to Articles 8 to 11. 
The Court’s frequent resort to the ‘the rights and freedoms of others’-clause in such 
cases, is a principal reason for the inconsistent nature of the case-law regarding this 
clause, mentioned above.73 More important for our present discussion, however, is the 
fact that framing these cases in terms of conflicting individual rights deforms the 
issues at stake and diverts the Court’s attention away from crucial questions. I will 
give two brief examples of such cases in this paragraph. 
A first example is the case of Colombani v. France. In this case, the applicants, two 
journalists, were convicted of publishing, in France, articles that insulted the King of 
Morocco. As their conviction clearly constituted an interference with the journalists’ 
exercise of their right to freedom of expression, the question arose as to whether this 
interference could be justified under one of the limitation grounds attached to Article 
10 of the Convention. For the Court, such a legitimate aim could be found in “the 
protection of the reputation and rights of others, in this instance the reigning King of 
Morocco”.74 The Court went on to hold that shielding foreign heads of State from 
criticism in this way: 
“amounts to conferring on foreign heads of State a special privilege that cannot be 
reconciled with modern practice and political conceptions. Whatever the obvious 
interest which every State has in maintaining friendly relations based on trust with the 
leaders of other States, such a privilege exceeds what is necessary for that objective 
to be attained”.75
The Court’s approach in this case reveals both dimensions of the Convention’s overall 
characteristics just described. First, the exclusively rights-based jurisdiction of the 
Court leads it to conceptualize the case as involving a conflict between fundamental 
rights: the journalists’ right to freedom of expression and the King of Morocco’s right 
to protection of his reputation. Clearly, however, this case is not in any important way 
about the King of Morocco as an individual in need of privacy protection, to be 
guaranteed to him by the French State.76 The fundamental issue in the case is instead 
about the desirable limitations to the French government’s powers to conduct its 
foreign relations. The conflict at the heart of the Colombani case, I would submit, is 
one between fundamental rights (to expression) and governmental powers (in foreign 
relations matters), not between the fundamental rights of different individuals. 
The final part of the Court’s reasoning, quoted above, reveals the second 
characteristic described earlier: the absence of a thick, substantive understanding of 
                                                 
73  See supra, Section 2. 
74  EctHR 25 June 2002, Colombani v. France, Reports 2002-V, para. 62. 
75  Id., para. 68. 
76  By way of a technical aside: it is not at all clear under current Convention case-law whether an 
individual in the situation of the King of Morocco in this case would even come within the 
‘jurisdiction’ of one of the Convention States, as would be necessary for such an individual to 
claim a violation of Convention rights before the Court.  
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the structure, needs and goals of a ‘democratic society’. All the Court is able to 
invoke in its decision is an undefined vision of “modern practice and political 
conceptions” and an abstract, utterly de-contextualized “obvious interest” in friendly 
relations between States.  
A second poignant example can be found in the case of Groppera Radio v. 
Switzerland.77 In this case, the Swiss government had refused a broadcasting license 
to a station broadcasting into Switzerland out of Italy. The government submitted that 
this interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression was for the 
protection of the rights of others “as it was designed to ensure pluralism, in particular 
of information, by allowing a fair allocation of frequencies”.78 This submission was 
accepted by the Court. In this case again, the underlying conflict of interests and 
values was conceptualized by the Court as one involving conflicting fundamental 
rights; those of broadcasters and those of listeners.79 It is submitted, however, that this 
conceptualization does not capture the most important dimension of the case. At the 
heart of the Groppera case we find, not a conflict between the rights of two distinct 
(groups of) individuals, but a conflict between two perspectives on freedom of 
expression and on the structures - within the media and between the media and 
government - required by, and for the support of, each of these perspectives. The 
argument that (all) individuals have individual fundamental rights in media pluralism 
is not, I would submit, easy to maintain. Outside of the technical Convention context, 
however, such an argument would not be necessary to make the more fundamental 
point that media pluralism is an important value in liberal societies.80 But because the 
Convention does not ‘think’ in terms of structures but relies so heavily on ‘rights’, 
this latter way of framing the case is hard to fit in. And because the Court has only a 
‘thin’ conception of a democratic society to work with, engaging in a debate on what 
a pluralistic, democratic society should look like will be fraught with difficulties.81
                                                 
77  ECtHR 28 March 1990, Groppera Radio v. Switzerland, Series A, vol. 173. 
78  Id., para. 69. 
79  Radio-listeners in general; evidently not those that listened to the applicant’s station! 
80  This assessment of Groppera Radio may be compared with Professor Richard Pildes’ discussion 
of the US Supreme Court judgment in Board of Education v. Pico (457 U.S. 853, 1981). In Pico, a 
number of parents challenged the decision of a local school board to remove nine books from the 
school’s public library. The Supreme Court held that this decision was unconstitutional, paying 
special attention to the Board’s motivation behind removing the books. The dissenters raised a 
host of objections, including the claim that any ‘right’ of the students to have certain books 
included (or not removed) from the library was unintelligible. For Pildes, “Pico is vulnerable to 
these criticisms not because it is wrong, but because the Court conceptualized the problem in 
conventional terms that obscure the important issues. (…) Once the Court framed the asserted 
rights in (…) individualistic terms, it generated the subsequent problems”. In Pildes’ view “the 
structural conception of rights, on the other hand, can make sense of this kind of conflict. The case 
is not about respecting the discrete interests of specific individuals, but about upholding the 
differentiation between politics and education” (732-733). 
81  It is true that the Court’s interpretation of some Convention rights, in particular of Article 10, 
relies at least to some extent on structural objectives. See for example the classic Handyside 
judgment (“Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of [a democratic] 
society, one of the basic conditions for its progress”), Handyside v. The United Kingdom, supra 
note 69, para. 49, and, more recently the judgment in the Karatas-case (“Art. 10 of the 
Convention] affords the opportunity to take part in the public exchange of cultural, political and 
social information and ideas of all kinds (…). Those who create, perform, distribute or exhibit 
works of art contribute to the exchange of ideas and opinions which is essential for a democratic 
society”), ECtHR 8 July 1999, Karatas v. Turkey, Reports 1999-IV, para. 49. These statements in 
the case law do not, however, detract fundamentally from the more general argument in this paper 
as (a) they do not change the fact that the Court’s conceptual apparatus remains uniquely focused 
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The  strained character of the use of the ‘rights of others’-clause in these cases is 
underlined by an analysis of cases involving not the Articles 8 to 11 with their 
‘paragraph 2’-structure, but other Convention rights that do not have a similar 
limitative list of limitation-grounds, such as the right to marry and the right to free 
elections. Let me give two examples. 
The Court’s leading case with regard to the right to marry, F. v. Switzerland, 
concerned a temporary ban on remarriage imposed after a divorce.82 According to the 
Swiss government, the system of temporarily prohibiting remarriage was justified  
“by the legislature’s determination to protect not only the institution of marriage but 
also the rights of others”.83 Scrutinizing the government’s defence under Article 12 of 
the Convention, the Court said the following: 
“The Court recognizes that the stability of marriage is a legitimate aim which is in 
the public interest. It doubts, however, whether the particular means used were 
appropriate for achieving that aim. (…) In any event, the Court cannot accept the 
argument that the temporary prohibition of remarriage is designed to preserve the 
rights of others, namely of those of the future spouse of the divorced person”.84
The cited paragraph forms a striking contrast with the Court’s statements in cases 
such as Colombani and Groppera Radio. The ‘stability of marriage’ is here accepted 
as a legitimate aim ‘in the public interest’, while at the same time, justification in 
terms of the protection of the ‘rights of others’ is explicitly rejected. The Court could 
only make this distinction, of course, because Article 12 does not present the same 
constraints as do the Articles 8 to 11 with their limitative lists of limitation-grounds. It 
is interesting to note, however, that in this case the Court jumps at the opportunity of 
justifying a limitation to a fundamental right ‘in the public interest’ while going out of 
its way to reject justification in the name of ‘the rights of others’.  
Because of the clear connections between a right such as freedom of expression and 
the right to free elections, the Court’s case-law on this latter right  offers an even 
stronger illustration of the effect of the constraints of the ‘paragraph 2’-framework, 
applicable to Article 10, but not to Article 3 of the 1st Protocol (Art. 3-P1). In the 
recent case of Hirst v. The United Kingdom, the government argued that 
disenfranchisement of prisoners “pursued the intertwined legitimate aims of 
preventing crime and punishing offenders and enhancing civic responsibility and 
respect for the rule of law”.85 In its reaction, the Court made explicit reference to the 
absence of a ‘paragraph 2’ construction in Art. 3-P1, saying:  
“The Court would recall that Article 3 of Protocol No.1 does not, as other provisions 
of the Convention, specify or limit the aims which a measure must pursue. A wider 
range of purposes may therefore be compatible with Article 3.”86
A wider view of such permissible purposes was indeed taken in Hirst, but also in 
earlier election cases such as Podkolzina v. Latvia (imposition of Latvian as sole 
working-language in the Latvian Parliament, brought under “the interest of each State 
                                                                                                                              
on rights with no attention to powers, and (b) as argued earlier, the structural objectives invoked 
build on notions of a democratic society that are ‘thinner’ than those of most legal orders. 
82  F. v. Switzerland, supra note 20. 
83  Id., para. 35 (my emphasis, JB). 
84  Id., para. 36. 
85  ECtHR 6 October 2005, Hirst v. The United Kingdom, para. 50.  
86  Id., para. 74. 
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in ensuring that its own institutional system functions normally”)87 and Mathieu-
Mohin v. Belgium (legitimate aim “to defuse the language disputes in the country by 
establishing more stable and decentralized organizational structures”)88. 
The Court’s oblique reference in Hirst to the difference in formulation between Art. 
3-P1 and ‘certain other rights’, in my view, bypasses a crucial question: are the 
differences between the fundamental right to cast a vote and the right to express an 
opinion really so great as to justify entirely the differences in approach under the 
Convention? I would argue that they are not, and that the Court’s analysis of a much 
‘wider range of purposes’, in its own words, under Art. 3-P1, without any effort to 
cast important societal aims in terms of opposing individual fundamental rights (the 
individual fundamental right of Belgians to live under more stable and decentralized 
organizational structures? the individual fundamental right of Latvian MP’s not to be 
addressed in another language?) is a powerful reminder of the artificiality of much of 
its approach to the clause ‘the rights and freedoms of others’. 
5.3.  The missing structural perspective (2): Neglected aims 
The previous paragraph has discussed cases in which the Court uses the clause ‘the 
rights and freedoms of others’ in order to suit grounds for limiting fundamental rights 
that would otherwise be hard to square with the Convention. This approach, I have 
argued, both denatures the clause itself and contributes to misunderstandings of the 
fundamental issues in actual cases. This ‘translation process’ of a wide range of 
objectives into the accepted limitation ground ‘the rights of others’, sometimes causes 
important aspects of cases to get, as it were, lost in translation. This paragraph offers 
an example of such loss. 
The Strasbourg Court, like many other courts involved in fundamental rights 
protection, has been confronted with the issue of ‘hate speech’; the question of 
whether and to what extent racist or extremist speech should be entitled to protection 
under the freedom of expression. It is instructive to compare the approach of the 
European Court in its seminal Jersild v. Denmark case, with the approach of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in its case of R. v. Keegstra (1990), on the question of the 
justification of imposing limits on ‘hate speech’.89 For the European Court in the 
Jersild case, it was simply “uncontested that the interference pursued a legitimate aim, 
namely, the ‘protection of the reputation or rights of others’”.90 The relevant portion 
of the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment offers a striking contrast. The Court held:  
“Essentially, there are two sorts of injury caused by hate propaganda. First, there is 
harm done to members of the target group.  (…) A second harmful effect of hate 
propaganda which is of pressing and substantial concern is its influence upon society 
at large”.91
The second element in the Supreme Court’s reasoning - an element of “pressing and 
substantial concern” - is entirely absent from the Strasbourg Court’s explicit 
reasoning. This is, I would submit, because the objective of countering hate speech’s 
                                                 
87  ECtHR 9 April 2002, Podkolzina v. Latvia, Reports 2002-II, para. 34. 
88  ECtHR 2 March 1987, Mathieu-Mohin v. Belgium, Series A, vol. 113, para. 57. 
89  Jersild v. Denmark, supra note 5. Canada, Supreme Court 13 December 1990, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 
697, per Dickson J. 
90  Jersild v. Denmark, supra note 5, para. 27. 
91  R. v. Keegstra, supra note 89, 53. 
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“influence upon society at large” cannot be fitted in the limitation clauses attached to 
Article 10 of the Convention as easily as the “harm done to members of the target 
group”. But limiting the accepted justification of measures against hate speech to the 
protection of the rights of members of the target group significantly undervalues the 
importance of these measures to society at large. Funnelling the wider range of 
objectives legitimately pursued by such governmental action into the narrow channel 
of the protection of ‘the rights of others’ mischaracterizes the case as involving a 
fundamental conflict between the rights of distinct groups of individuals, instead of 
primarily raising crucial questions of broader structural design of relevance to all in a 
democratic society.  
5.4. The missing structural perspective (3): Aims and Effects 
The Convention’s exclusive focus on rights to the neglect of structures contributes, 
finally, to an overvaluation of the importance of effects on individuals in specific 
cases and to an undervaluation of critical scrutiny of the wider aims pursued by, and 
of effects to be expected from, governmental action.  
The case of Wingrove v. The United Kingdom, a blasphemy case, may be adduced as 
an example of this point.92 In this case, the United Kingdom authorities had acted 
against the distribution of a film - The Ecstasy of Saint Theresa -, which was deemed 
pornographic and blasphemous. One of the objections of the applicants was that the 
English legislation used was only applicable to blasphemous expressions with regard 
to the Christian faith. The Court was unfazed: 
“It is true that the English law of blasphemy only extends to the Christian faith. 
However, (…) the extent to which English law protects other beliefs is not in issue 
before the Court which must confine its attention to the case before it. The 
uncontested fact that the law of blasphemy does not treat on an equal footing the 
different religions practiced in the United Kingdom does not detract from the 
legitimacy of the aim pursued in the present context”.93  
A Court with a broader, structural perspective on rights protection would, I suggest, 
have unhesitatingly condemned the United Kingdom’s patently discriminatory 
legislation.94 Such discrimination on grounds of religion is precisely the sort of 
danger that many courts see as their primary duty to protect against. For the 
Strasbourg Court, however, the aim pursued by the legislation of protecting against 
the treatment of a religious subject in such manner “as to be calculated (that is, bound, 
not intended) to outrage those who have an understanding of, sympathy towards and 
support for the Christian story and ethic” “undoubtedly” corresponded to that of the 
protection of the rights of others within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 10 of 
the Convention; an observation that settled the legitimacy of the government’s 
measure in principle.95 96
                                                 
92  ECtHR 25 November 1996, Wingrove v. The United Kingdom, Reports 1996-V. 
93  Wingrove v. The United Kingdom, supra note 92, para. 50. 
94  Comparison with the United States Supreme Court’s approach in the case of R.A.V. v. St. Paul is 
instructive in this regard. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). In this case, it was precisely the fact that the 
relevant legislation singled out racially motivated offences that formed the main reason for the 
Court to find a violation of the First Amendment. 
95  Note: the discussion on the lack of a structural perspective is related, but not identical, to 
discussions on the difference between concrete and abstract review. While the extreme 
concreteness of the Court’s review, by comparative standards, may make it harder to engage in the 
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6. Taking ‘Conflicts of Fundamental Rights’ Seriously 
6.1. Introduction 
The preceding Sections have presented a critique of the Convention’s use of a wide 
category of ‘conflicts of fundamental rights’, against the background of the claim, 
elaborated in Section 2, that legal orders have at least some degree of leeway in 
choosing whether to frame basic conflicts in terms of opposing fundamental rights or 
through alternative conceptualizations. The question that remains for this last Section 
is the following; how can this largely external critique be effectively applied within 
the context of current Convention theory and practice? It is easy to argue for a 
‘structuralist perspective’ or for the elaboration of a thicker notion of ‘democratic 
society’, but what good are such arguments under present circumstances, given 
present institutional and political constraints? This Section will argue, in reply, that a 
great deal can actually be learned from an awareness of Convention exceptionalism 
with regard to ‘conflicts of fundamental rights’; insights that can be applied directly to 
achieve better practical results in concrete cases.  
This argument is built-up as follows. I will first try to show that the Court’s choice for 
a wide category of cases involving ‘conflicts of fundamental rights’ can be seen as 
partially motivated by a desire to further the aim of de-politicization through micro-
management, but that the possibility of actually achieving this goal is - to a large 
extent - an illusion. To the extent, therefore, that the Convention’s wide category is 
not merely a product of institutional constraints but a matter of conscious design, this 
effort would seem to rest, at least partially, on misguided assumptions. 
The next paragraph presents four practical suggestions on how to identify cases in 
which a narrower conception of the category of conflicts of rights would be desirable. 
These suggestions focus on cases in which (a) the relevant ‘others’ form a majority of 
the relevant population, (b) ‘the others’ are state institutions or public officials in a 
public capacity, and (c) in which it is arguable that the case contains an element of 
redistribution of public resources. 
6.2. Illusions of micro-management, juridification and de-politicization 
An important part of the reason for the Convention’s comparatively wide category of 
‘conflicts of fundamental rights’ must be found in factors related to institutional 
constraints; constraints to a large extent imposed by the Convention’s framers, 
especially through their choice for the ‘paragraph 2’-framework for certain important 
Convention rights. Some element of this wide category, however, does seem 
attributable do conscious design on behalf of the modern Court. The point can only be 
developed schematically in the context of this paper; a fuller statement would require 
                                                                                                                              
broader kind of analysis suggested here, such an approach would by no means be impossible 
under current institutional constraints. See E.A. Alkema, supra note 35, 60 for a discussion of 
concrete vs. abstract review in the Court’s practice. 
96  This assessment of the Court’s approach to aims and effects of governmental action finds a 
comparative parallel in Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat’s analysis of ‘purpose scrutiny’ in US 
Supreme Court practice. According to Bhagwat, the Supreme Court’s “failure to develop a 
coherent framework for analyzing government interest” has moved it to employ difficult and 
controversial balancing tests in cases where such an approach was unnecessary. See A. Bhagwat, 
Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 California Law Review 297, 311 (1997). 
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a much longer analysis. On a very basic level, however, it seems the Court may be 
enamoured by the idea of the possibility of micro-managing conflicts - and thus de-
politicizing them - by framing them as conflicts of individual rights rather than as 
opposing individuals and majorities. It may be that the absence of a structural 
perspective on questions of normative and institutional design and the lack of a thick 
notion of democratic society are all - at least partially - due to conscious choices on 
behalf of the Court not to get drawn into the most contentious contemporary debates 
precisely over majority/minority relations in pluralist societies. By limiting the 
politically overwhelming public interest to the ‘rights’ of a few ‘others’ concerned, 
the Court may want to limit the potential implications and impact of litigation before 
it. The fewer sections and concerns of society implicated, the ‘smaller’ the conflict 
becomes.  
Framing conflicts in terms of opposing rights may be thought by the Court to have the 
additional benefit of ‘juridifying’ them; a conflict between individual rights is clearly 
the business of law and of courts rather than that of politicians, much more so than a 
conflict where an individual’s rights are seen to thwart important majority 
preferences. Micro-management and juridification, in turn, are appealing avenues for 
an international court interested in de-politicizing as much as possible the questions 
before it.  
It has to be emphasized, however, that the strategy of de-politicization through 
technical conceptualizations can only work to a certain extent. As has been mentioned 
several times before; whether a conflict is framed in terms of conflicting rights or not, 
the underlying basic questions and dilemmas will not go away. Protecting important 
individual interests in the face of majority preferences will still be as potentially 
costly or cumbersome. Member States will still feel the impact of the European 
Court’s decisions, whether they are reasoned on the basis of rights-conflicts or 
otherwise.  
6.3. Taking ‘conflicts of fundamental rights’ seriously: Suspicious and suboptimal 
conceptualizations 
In Taking Rights Seriously, professor Ronald Dworkin offers an important suggestion 
on how to deal with cases presented as involving a conflict between individual rights. 
He writes: 
“We must recognize as competing rights only the rights of other members of the 
society as individuals. We must distinguish the ‘rights’ of the majority as such, which 
cannot count as a justification for overruling individual rights, and the personal 
rights of members of a majority, which might well count”.97
One does not have to agree with Dworkin’s strong position on the trump-like nature 
of rights vis-à-vis the public interest, to agree with his insistence on the importance of 
making a qualitative distinction between cases involving a conflict between the rights 
of different individuals as individuals and conflicts between individual rights and the 
interests of majorities expressed in terms of ‘rights’ of their members. In this way, 
Dworkin’s suggestion serves as an important reminder of the dangers of too broad a 
conception of the category of ‘conflicts of individual rights’. 
                                                 
97  R. Dworkin, supra note 1, 194. 
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The fundamental question then becomes, or rather: remains: how are we to distinguish 
between cases involving ‘true’ conflicts of fundamental rights held by individuals qua 
individuals and cases involving conflicts between individual rights and the public 
interest, expressed in the language of rights? Dworkin himself does not offer clear 
guidelines on how to make this distinction and the discussion so far in this paper has 
merely underlined the difficulties involved in conceptualizing a ‘hard’ line of 
separation between the two types of cases.98 Given these problems, the most we may 
be able to achieve at this time could be the elaboration of a list of factors indicating 
when use of the category of conflicts of fundamental rights would be suspect or 
suboptimal. Building on Dworkin’s formulation, these factors should help us single 
out those cases where the interests of those seen as ‘others’ are not distinguishable to 
a sufficient degree from the general interests shared by all members of society.  
Where these interests are insufficiently distinguishable, one or both of two dangers 
may surface, rendering conceptualization as a ‘conflict of individual rights’ 
suspicious, suboptimal or both. Such conceptualization may be suspicious wherever 
the understanding of cases as involving a conflict of rights carries a danger of pro-
majoritarian bias in rights adjudication. This danger is one of systematic under-
protection of individual fundamental rights by way of an excessive valuation of the 
opposing ‘public interest’ itself understood in terms of fundamental rights.99 
Conceptualization in terms of conflicting rights may be suboptimal whenever there is 
a risk that such an understanding of the case will not place the Court’s focus on the 
most important questions to be resolved, without there necessarily being a danger of 
structural bias one way or the other. 
The presence of one or more of these factors would not mean that conceptualization 
as a conflict between rights is per se undesirable, but should give cause to reconsider 
a way of framing perhaps thought to be natural or self-evident within a given legal 
order. 
6.4. (1): Majorities as ‘others’ 
The first type of cases in which conceptualization as a conflict between individual 
fundamental rights may be suspect involves cases in which the ‘others’ in ‘the rights 
of others’ constitute a majority of the relevant population. Whenever there is a clear 
conflict between the interests of one or more individuals - not yet expressed in terms 
of fundamental rights - and those of the general population, allowing the general 
population to assert their - relatively uniform - interest in terms of a multitude of 
individual fundamental rights will be especially risky. This first guideline suggests 
that the way the Court has dealt with cases such as Otto-Preminger-Institut, where the 
‘others’ constituted a whopping 87% of the relevant population, and Wingrove has 
been suspicious.100
The Court’s decision in the famous case of Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom shows 
how the relevant distinction could be made in specific instances.101 In this case, the 
Court thought a legitimate aim for the continued criminalization of adult homosexual 
                                                 
98  See supra, Section 3. 
99  This is the danger Dworkin is concerned about. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
100  See supra, Section 2.4. Confirmation of the fears aroused by this suspicion might, many would 
claim, be found in the material outcome in Otto-Preminger v. Austria, supra note 4 and Wingrove 
v. The United Kingdom, supra note 92: insufficient protection for freedom of expression. 
101  ECtHR 20 October 1981, Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom, Series A, vol. A45. 
25 
 
relations could, in principle, be found in both the government’s interest in 
“safeguarding the moral ethos or moral standards of society as a whole” and in “the 
safeguarding of the moral interests and welfare of certain individuals or classes of 
individuals who are in need of special protection”.102 The Court found it “somewhat 
artificial (…) to draw a rigid distinction” between safeguarding the morals of society 
and protecting the rights of others, as the protection of moral standards could 
encompass the protection of certain groups or classes of weaker individuals and 
therefore took both aims into consideration.103 Applying Dworkin’s distinction, and 
the perspective defended in this paper, however, suggests that precisely the distinction 
between safeguarding a general interest in moral standards and the rights of (groups 
of) vulnerable individuals, was in no way ‘artificial’, but rather crucial to the 
resolution of the case. In the perspective of this paper, then, the Court’s classification 
of Dudgeon as involving a ‘conflict of fundamental rights’ was suspicious. 
With regard to the practical application of this factor, it is important to note that 
failure to identify precisely who the ‘others’ are for the purposes of application of the 
clause ‘the rights and freedoms of others’, may result in confusion as to whether these 
others do in fact constitute a majority or a relatively large segment of the population 
and as to whether these ‘others’ have any special interests distinguishable from those 
of all other members of society.104  
6.5. (2): Public bodies and officials as ‘others’  
A second type of cases in which conceptualization as a conflict between individual 
fundamental rights may be suspicious, concerns cases in which the ‘others’ concerned 
are  public bodies or individuals who (also) have an official capacity that has at least 
some relation to the claimed rights infringement. The Court’s case-law reveals a 
number of cases in which the interests of public authorities or public officials were 
dealt with under the ‘rights and freedoms of others’ clause. Particularly problematic 
are those cases in which public bodies - local governments, agencies etc. - are brought 
within the category of ‘others’ for the purposes of the limitation clause to the Articles 
8 to 11.105 Without wanting to go into complex discussions on whether governmental 
authorities can ever themselves be holders of fundamental rights, it seems clear that 
allowing governments to assert their own interests - and interests defended on behalf 
of society generally - as ‘rights’ in the context of limiting the fundamental rights of 
individuals, deforms the conflict in precisely the way warned against by professor 
Dworkin. 
More difficult are cases in which the ‘others’ are individuals with an official capacity. 
Here, the distinction between limiting fundamental rights for the protection of the 
individual rights of public officials qua individuals and limiting fundamental rights 
for the protection of the functioning of government will be hard to make in some 
cases. Presence of this factor should, therefore, again be treated merely as an 
indication that conceptualization as a ‘conflict of fundamental rights’ is suspect, not 
as conclusive evidence against use of the category ‘the rights and freedoms of others’. 
                                                 
102  Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom, supra note 101, para. 47 (my emhasis, JB). 
103  Id., para. 47. 
104  This criticism of the Court’s current approach was formulated supra in Section 2. 
105  See for example Connors v. The United Kingdom, supra note 28, para. 69. The applicant and the 
respondent State were in agreement as to the legitimacy of the aim pursued. 
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Even for these difficult cases involving public officials or individuals with an official 
capacity, some guidelines may be given. As the relevant cases tend to concern 
freedom of expression - Article 10 of the Convention - I will develop these guidelines 
with reference to this specific fundamental right.  
A basic distinction may be made as follows. Where, as for example in the case of 
Lingens v. Austria, the interference with an individual’s freedom of expression is 
based upon provisions of general criminal or civil law that accord no special status to 
public officials, the case is more likely not to differ fundamentally from an ordinary 
(defamation) case.106 In these cases there should be, accordingly, less ground for 
suspicion.107 Where, on the other hand the interference with the right to freedom of 
expression is based upon special legislation - or on an interpretation of general 
legislation tailored to the ‘needs’ of protecting public officials -, there will be extra 
cause for alarm. This perspective suggests that the Court may have erred in accepting 
the ‘rights of others’ justification ground in cases such as Colombani v. France - 
concerning the two French journalists’ defamation of the King of Morocco -108 and 
Castells v. Spain - regarding the conviction of Mr. Castells for the specific crime of 
damaging ‘the Government’s honour’.109
A special category of cases concerns expression critical of judicial authorities, 
including prosecutors. Such cases occupy a peculiar position as the judiciary as a 
whole benefits from one of the few structural aims explicitly allowed for by the 
Convention: the limitation ground “maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary”, attached only to Article 10. Given the inclusion of this specific structural 
concern, it could be thought that the question of whether a particular governmental 
measure actually furthers this aim or not - as distinct from merely protecting the 
‘rights of others’ generally - would be an important one. However, in the key case of 
Nikula v. Finland, where a public prosecutor brought a private action for defamation 
allegedly having occurred in the course of judicial proceedings, the Court found that it 
did not have to decide whether these private proceedings served the legitimate aim of 
protecting the judiciary, as it could accept “that the interference in any case pursued 
the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation and rights” of the individual prosecutor 
involved.110 The perspective adopted in this paper suggests, however, that just like the 
distinction between morals and ‘rights of others’ deemed “artificial” in Dudgeon, the 
difference between protecting the rights of others and protecting the judiciary as a 
whole may have been an issue that would have merited more attention from the Court 
than it actually received. 
                                                 
106  ECtHR 8 July 1986, Lingens v. Austria, Series A, vol. 103, para. 36 and 20 (conviction for 
defamation of a member of parliament based on the general Article 111 of the Austrian Criminal 
Code).  
107  The danger of pro-institutional bias on the Member State level, however, would indicate that there 
remains some ground to treat these cases carefully. 
108  See supra, Section 5.2. 
109  ECtHR 23 April 1992, Castells v. Spain, Series A, vol. 236, para. 39 (given the volatile situation 
in Spain in 1979, “the proceedings instituted against the applicant were brought for the 
‘prevention of disorder’ within the meaning of Article 10 para. 2, and not only for the ‘protection 
of the reputation … of others”, my emphasis, JB). 
110  Nikula v. Finland, supra note 37, para. 38. 
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6.6. (3): Redistribution and access to public resources 
A final factor, indicating that conceptualization as a ‘conflict of rights’ may be 
suboptimal, builds on the earlier discussion of factual contingency, above in Section 
3.2. This factor holds that conceptualization as a ‘conflict of rights’ may be 
inadequate whenever the case has some relation to decisions over the redistribution 
of, or access to, public resources. Whenever questions concerning the allocation of 
public resources - money, institutions, jobs, licences - are involved, the whole of the 
public interest will be implicated to such an extent that framing cases as turning upon 
an essentially ‘local’ or ‘private’ conflict between two (groups of) individuals, will 
leave out of focus a crucial dimension of the basic conflict. This perspective suggests 
that cases such as Groppera Radio - concerning access to Swiss radio spectrum - were 
probably sub-optimally classified as constituting ‘conflicts of rights’.111  
Deciding when an element of redistribution of public resources is sufficiently 
implicated in a case for this factor to have significant weight will not be an easy 
matter. This factor may, however, be quite easily and profitably applied negatively, 
suggesting that cases involving not a hint of redistribution or access to resources - 
conflicts between children’s rights and parents’ rights,112 or defamation cases in 
purely private settings - may safely be understood as constituting genuine conflicts of 
individual fundamental rights. 
7. Conclusion: The future of conflicts of rights before a quasi-constitutional court 
The argument in this paper has been constructed on the implicit basic premise that the 
way conflicts are framed before and by courts matters. Framing is important for 
reasons such as argumentative integrity, coherence in case-law, and - especially 
significant in fundamental rights cases - avoiding pro-majoritarian biases. The basic 
problem faced by courts and commentators, however, is that it is often not at all self-
evident what any given fundamental rights case exactly is about. And although it 
may, therefore, often be surprisingly difficult to determine whether a case should be 
understood as either a conflict between fundamental rights of discrete individuals or 
as a conflict between an individual fundamental right and a general societal interest, 
the paper has shown that precisely this determination often will have important 
implications. 
Against this theoretical background, the paper has argued that the Convention 
mechanism specifically is dependent on an extremely wide - by comparative 
standards - category of ‘conflicts of fundamental rights’. This dependency has several 
causes, among which are the framers’ choice for limitative lists of ‘legitimate aims’ 
attached to the important Articles 8 to 11, the Strasbourg Court’s lack of ‘division of 
powers’-jurisdiction and the absence of a ‘thick’ conception of a ‘democratic society’ 
at the European level. I have argued, however, that at least a proportion of cases 
currently brought within this wide category of ‘conflicts of rights’ by the Court, 
would be better dealt with through alternative conceptualizations. Understanding 
                                                 
111  See supra, Section 5.2. Note: Many cases involving the distribution of public resources will be 
classified as ‘positive obligations’-cases. As  the limitation clauses of the Articles 8 to 11 of the 
Convention do not apply directly to positive obligations, the Court will have more possibilities for 
avoiding use of the clause ‘the rights and freedoms of others’. See for example: Dickson v. The 
United Kingdom, supra note 11, para. 32-33. 
112  See for example Venema v. The Netherlands, supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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these cases as being about conflicts of individual fundamental rights is liable to direct 
judicial attention away from what is really at stake and may in some cases carry a 
danger of pro-majoritarian bias.113 To avoid these dangers, the Strasbourg Court 
should take all care to make sure conflicts of fundamental rights are taken seriously. 
Taking conflicts of fundamental rights seriously primarily implies, the paper has 
argued, a better use of the legal category ‘the rights and freedoms of others’. The 
Court should be more explicit about ‘whom’ others are, what their ‘rights’ are, or 
about what the effect is of the use of this specific category on other aspects of its 
analysis, such as the margin of appreciation.114 These criticisms are all part of a more 
general critique of the stringency of the ‘legitimate aim’ test in the Court’s case law. 
Taking conflicts of rights seriously also implies a preference for alternative 
conceptualizations in at least some cases. Cases opposing individuals to majorities or 
to public officials and authorities and cases involving some element of redistribution 
of public resources, should not be seen, the paper has argued, as conflicts of 
individual rights but as conflicts over powers and over structure. 
This last suggestion may sometimes be difficult to incorporate in practice, at least for 
as long as the Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention maintain their ‘paragraph 2’-
construction. But even where institutional constraints preclude direct application of 
the suggestions offered here, this paper’s argument should not be without relevance. 
Awareness of the dangers of bias and misdirected focus can always be helpful, even if 
the Convention’s set-up does not allow for certain cases to be technically framed in 
another way. On a more general level; calling attention to the contingency of the 
Court’s approach and to elements of Convention exceptionalism may ultimately serve 
to counteract perhaps overenthusiastic pleas for the Strasbourg Court to be seen as a 
constitutional court and for the Convention to be taken as a constitution for Europe. 
Regardless of one’s views on the direction in which the Convention system should 
ultimately develop, the paper’s argument has underlined that essential steps in such a 
transition may at this point in time be impossible to take given the Convention’s 
current institutional set-up. It would clearly be a heartfelt loss if the Convention 
system’s amazingly successful history as an international subsidiary enforcement 
mechanism for human rights would in any way be jeopardized by perhaps overly 
hasty constitutional ambitions. 
                                                 
113  It is important to note that the plea for a smaller category of conflicts of rights is not identical to an 
argument for ‘less’ rights protection; not for the original applicant, nor for the opposing interests.  
114  See for a discussion of the Court’s divergent answers to this question the contribution of Peggy 
Ducoulombier in this volume. 
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